Deng Xiaoping’s Institutional Transformation: An Authoritarian Engineering Project from Mobilization to Control 邓小平变法：一场从动员到管制的极权转型工程

Version: 1.0
Date: January 9, 2026
Author: Ping Political
Affiliation: Independent Researcher
Email: [email protected]
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18205295

Keywords: Deng Xiaoping Reform, Authoritarian Transformation, Mobilization–Development–Control Model, Post-1989 Political Reconfiguration, Authoritarian Sustainability, Technocratic Governance, Risk Management State, Depoliticization, Control-Oriented Stability, Legalist Rationality (Shang Yang)

Abstract

This article introduces “Deng Xiaoping’s institutional transformation” as a core analytical concept and proposes a three-stage model of authoritarian governance—mobilization, development, and control—to reinterpret the structural evolution of the Chinese Communist Party’s ruling logic since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. It argues that the CCP did not experiment with fundamentally different political models across historical periods; rather, under changing conditions, it consistently sought to avoid the same outcome: the genuine transfer of political power to the people.

From 1949 to 1989, mobilization-based rule relied on mass politics and ideological campaigns. While capable of extraordinary short-term mobilization, this model was inherently unstable and ultimately unsustainable, and by 1989 it was collectively judged within the regime as a high-risk governing path. It was precisely on the basis of this failure that Deng Xiaoping initiated a transformation of institutional significance. Instead of attempting to resolve legitimacy crises through political reform or renewed mass mobilization, he redefined economic development as a purely instrumental strategy—systematically accumulating fiscal capacity, technological resources, and organizational control, while simultaneously constructing structural buffers against external intervention. This process laid the necessary foundations for a later transition toward comprehensive control.

Within this framework, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping should not be understood as representatives of competing political lines, but as functionally differentiated executors within a staged authoritarian design. Their respective historical roles were to expand the development phase, lay the groundwork for control, and complete the control-oriented governing system. In this sense, Deng Xiaoping’s transformation was not a reform leading toward openness, but a reconstruction of authoritarian rule carried out after the failure of reform itself—culminating in a control-based steady state centered on risk management, technological governance, and stability as an end in itself.

0. Introduction: Why a New Explanatory Framework Is Needed

0.1 Limitations of Existing Narratives

Mainstream interpretations of the evolution of governance in the People’s Republic of China have long relied on two highly simplified explanatory frameworks. The first understands the post-1978 period as a linear process of “reform and opening,” while the second explains changes in elite politics through “line struggles” or factional competition. Although these narratives differ in emphasis at the descriptive level, they share a common avoidance of a fundamental question: did the CCP’s governing logic itself undergo a structural reconstruction, rather than merely oscillating at the level of policy?

The “reform and opening” narrative is often treated in moralized and teleological terms, understood as a natural correction following the failure of the Cultural Revolution and as a path toward marketization, institutional rationalization, or even political liberalization. Yet this interpretation overlooks a crucial fact: the reform experiments of the 1980s did not succeed. Instead, they ended in political collapse and violent repression in 1989. If 1989 is treated merely as a “setback” or an aberration within an otherwise continuous reform process, it becomes impossible to explain why, over the subsequent three decades, CCP governance has followed a remarkably consistent trajectory characterized by tightening control and increasing technological sophistication. [1]

Similarly, explanations centered on “line struggles” or “factional rivalry” have become increasingly inadequate. On the one hand, leadership transitions have not produced substantive changes in governing logic; on the other hand, leadership groups that appear markedly different in style, rhetoric, and public image have nevertheless displayed striking continuity in critical decisions. This suggests that the core of elite politics in China is not competition between alternative governing lines, but more plausibly a functional division of roles within a pre-defined governing project. [1]

0.2 Research Questions

In light of these limitations, this article poses three core research questions:

1. Why has the CCP’s governing logic exhibited a clear stage-based evolution, rather than random oscillation or repeated line reversals?

2. Why, despite frequent leadership turnover, has the direction of governance not reversed but instead become progressively more entrenched?

3. Should the post-1989 period be understood as an interruption of reform, or as the starting point of a deeper form of institutional design?

These questions cannot be adequately addressed through binary frameworks such as “reform versus anti-reform” or “opening versus tightening”. Instead, they require a new model capable of explaining continuity, stage differentiation, and outcome lock-in simultaneously. [1]

0.3 Core Argument

This article proposes a stage-based model of CCP rule—“mobilization–development–control” —and argues that the governing logic of the People’s Republic of China has not oscillated between reform and conservatism. Rather, under changing historical conditions, it has implemented a phased, goal-oriented project of rule.

Within this model:

• The mobilization stage (1949–1989) represents a form of governance inherited from the Mao era, characterized by intensive political mobilization, ideological integration, and rule through mass campaigns. While this stage exhibited strong short-term mobilizational capacity, it ultimately failed both politically and economically, reaching its definitive endpoint in the comprehensive breakdown of 1989.

• Crucially, 1989 should not be understood as a temporary interruption of the reform process, but as a negative conclusion reached after reform itself had been judged a high-risk path [1].

• It was precisely on the basis of this failure that Deng Xiaoping initiated an entirely new form of institutional design. Rather than continuing to seek legitimacy through political reform or renewed mobilization, the regime turned to development as a purely instrumental means—systematically accumulating state fiscal capacity, technological capabilities, and instruments of organizational control, while simultaneously constructing structural conditions to resist external interference. These efforts laid the groundwork for an eventual transition toward comprehensive control.

Accordingly, what this article terms the “Deng Xiaoping Transformation” was not a reform oriented toward openness, but a structural reconstruction premised on the failure of reform and aimed at maximizing the sustainability of rule. Within this reconstruction, development functioned as a means rather than an end, and liberalization was treated as a risk rather than a direction.

Furthermore, this article argues that Deng Xiaoping’s role was not limited to tactical adjustments between 1989 and 1992. Through highly forward-looking personnel arrangements, he designated Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao as executors of the development stage and the control-transition stage, respectively. In doing so, Deng effectively locked in an evolutionary path whereby the CCP moved from the failure of mobilization, to developmental accumulation, and ultimately toward comprehensive control.

In this sense, subsequent history did not deviate from the original design, but rather represented its continued implementation. Hu Jintao’s late-period emphasis on “stability maintenance” and the era of comprehensive control under Xi Jinping should not be understood as route reversals, but as relay executions of the same governing project at different stages.

1. Theoretical Framework: A Stage-Based Model of Rule—“Mobilization–Development–Control”

This article proposes a stage-based model of rule—“mobilization–development–control” to explain the historical evolution of the governing logic of the People’s Republic of China. The model argues that CCP rule has not revolved around abstract policy lines or ideological shifts, but has instead, under different historical conditions, successively adopted three functionally distinct modes of governance, all oriented toward a single core objective: regime survival [2][7].

Here, “stages” do not refer to a gradual, evolutionary continuum, but to governing schemes that are established, completed, and then replaced under specific conditions. Each stage is defined by its attempt to resolve the core problems that the previous stage proved incapable of addressing. Once the objectives of a given stage are achieved, its governing logic exits the historical arena and no longer reappears as a viable alternative [4].

1.1 Mobilizational Rule: High Mobilization, Low Stability, High Exhaustion

“Mobilizational rule” refers to a mode of governance centered on ideological integration, mass mobilization, and political campaigns as its core mechanisms. Its defining feature lies in the regime’s continuous production of political objectives and enemy–friend distinctions, through which social resources are mobilized to serve immediate governing needs, rather than being organized through institutionalized rules or sustainable incentive structures [6][10].

Under this model, governing effectiveness does not depend on economic performance or public administrative capacity, but on the intensity of mobilization itself. Society is persistently placed in a state of exception, individuals are embedded within collective political tasks, and obedience is treated as a moral obligation rather than a contractual or institutional commitment [6].

The primary advantage of mobilizational rule lies in its extraordinary short-term mobilizing capacity, enabling rapid concentration of resources under conditions of scarcity and institutional weakness. Its structural flaws, however, are equally pronounced: extreme instability, unpredictability, and enormous consumption of both social and state resources. Over time, this form of governance inevitably encounters mobilization fatigue, governance breakdown, and the risk of systemic collapse [2][4].

This article treats the period from 1949 to 1989 as a unified historical interval of mobilizational rule. Although this period witnessed multiple episodes of economic relaxation and policy adjustment, such measures did not alter the underlying mobilizational logic itself. Rather, they constituted cyclical repair attempts within a mobilizational system under stress, aimed at preserving the system rather than transcending it [1][5].

1.2 Developmental Rule: Releasing Vitality, Accumulating Resources, and Building Anti-Intervention Capacity

“Developmental rule” is not a stage of development in a normative or value-laden sense, but rather a transitional governing arrangement explicitly designed to serve regime objectives. Its core tasks extend beyond alleviating internal tensions and accumulating fiscal and administrative resources; more fundamentally, it seeks to systematically reduce the regime’s vulnerability within the international environment [2][7].

During this stage, the regime deliberately lowers the intensity of direct political mobilization and selectively releases economic and social vitality. By participating in globalization, absorbing external capital and technology, and expanding foreign trade and industrial scale, it accomplishes multiple forms of accumulation that were unattainable under the mobilizational system. These accumulations are highly instrumental in nature: their purpose is not to cultivate civil society or institutional constraints, but to construct a state apparatus capable of withstanding pressure from both domestic and external sources [3][5].

Internally, developmental rule—through fiscal expansion, infrastructure construction, and the enhancement of administrative capacity—endows the state with an unprecedented ability to mobilize and allocate resources, thereby providing the material foundation for more refined governance and control in subsequent stages [4]. Externally, it simultaneously mitigates the risks of foreign intervention: increased economic scale, deep embedding in global value chains, foreign exchange reserves, and technology transfer grant the regime greater room for maneuver and counteraction when facing sanctions, diplomatic pressure, or value-based conflicts [3].

In this sense, development is not a one-directional process of “opening,” but a strategic embedding into the global system aimed at neutralizing external constraints. Once a state’s size, market centrality, and integration into the global economy reach certain thresholds, the costs of systematic external intervention rise sharply, and the willingness to intervene correspondingly declines [3][4].

Accordingly, the function of developmental rule is not merely to defer internal conflicts, but to secure a relatively safe international environment for the regime, enabling it—once accumulation is largely complete—to advance toward a higher-intensity, lower-compromise form of governance [1].

1.3 Control-Oriented Rule: Technological Governance, Risk Isolation, and a Long-Term Steady State under the Decline of External Constraints

“Control-oriented rule” refers to a governing form that emerges once fiscal capacity, technological conditions, administrative control, and external shock-absorption capabilities have all accumulated beyond critical thresholds. At this stage, the regime shifts its governing objective from resource mobilization and conflict buffering toward the systematic management of risk itself. Risk control replaces developmental performance as the core logic of rule [2][4].

Unlike earlier stages, control-oriented rule neither relies on mass mobilization nor requires sustained high-speed economic growth as a source of legitimacy. Regime stability is no longer grounded in “developmental promises” or “reform prospects,” but in the predictability and intervenability of social and political behavior. Governance ceases to aim at winning consent and instead takes ensured compliance and controllability as its baseline premise [7].

Under this form, society is highly atomized and disassembled into manageable units. Potential risks are identified, categorized, labeled, and isolated in advance. The focus of governance is not the elimination of contradictions, but the prevention of their linkage, diffusion, and politicization. Political issues are systematically transformed into public security issues, technical problems, or isolated cases, thereby undergoing a process of depoliticization [9].

Technological instruments thus become the regime’s core resources. Data collection, continuous surveillance, algorithmic assessment, and grid-based management enable the state to implement high-frequency, low-intensity, yet comprehensive interventions without relying on large-scale political mobilization. Governance no longer seeks consensus but prioritizes efficiency; it no longer demands political loyalty, only behavioral controllability [8].

More crucially, during the stage of control-oriented rule, the regime’s structural fear of external interference significantly diminishes, and may even reverse altogether. Following the long accumulation of the developmental stage, the state—across economic scale, global value-chain embeddedness, financial resources, technological capacity, and international interdependencies—possesses sufficient capability to offset or even counter external pressure. Sanctions, diplomatic coercion, or value-based conflicts no longer constitute existential threats but are incorporated into the category of manageable risks [3].

It is under these conditions that the regime sheds its previous sensitivity to “international image,” “external recognition,” and “intervention costs,” and instead, when necessary, proactively deploys economic, diplomatic, institutional, and informational tools to exert influence externally. External behavior no longer prioritizes conflict avoidance, but centers on safeguarding regime security and institutional integrity. The external world is transformed from a potential threat into an object that can be utilized, divided, or pressured [3][4].

Control-oriented rule does not aim at achieving “zero problems”. On the contrary, as long as society as a whole remains within a predictable range, localized repression, targeted elimination, or even high-intensity coercion—whether applied domestically or externally—are regarded as acceptable or even necessary governance costs. Stability no longer means universal satisfaction, but rather that the system does not spiral out of control [2].

In this sense, control-oriented rule represents the completed state of the governing logic: the regime no longer needs mobilization to prove its correctness, nor development to exchange for social support, nor external tolerance or institutional acceptance. Order is maintained directly through control capacity and shock-absorption capability themselves [1][10][11].

1.4 Irreversibility and Path Dependence Between Stages

“Mobilization–development–control” does not constitute a policy cycle that can be freely reversed, but rather a stage-based governing trajectory subject to clear structural constraints. Once a stage is established, it systematically eliminates—at the institutional, technological, and organizational levels—the possibility that the previous stage could reappear as a viable option [4][10].

Once mobilization-oriented rule is judged to be high-risk and unsustainable, the mass politics and governance through states of exception on which it relies can no longer be reactivated under modern social conditions. Once development-oriented rule has completed the accumulation of governing resources and external shock-resistance capacity, further expansion instead amplifies social mobility and uncertainty, turning growth itself into a new source of risk. And once control-oriented rule is established, its technological foundations, organizational inertia, and governance cost structures continuously reinforce a preference for control and automatically exclude high-risk alternatives [2][3][8].

Accordingly, stage transitions do not arise from ideological renewal or leaders’ personal preferences, but from path-locking processes under fixed regime objectives and real-world constraints. Once a stage is recognized as “completed,” its governing logic exits the historical stage and no longer exists as a selectable alternative [1][4].

Within this framework, leadership turnover, shifts in discourse, or differences in political style are insufficient to alter the governing trajectory. At most, they affect the pace of execution or modes of presentation, but cannot reverse the stage direction. Once the governing logic completes the closed loop from mobilization to control, the political system enters a highly rigid steady state, in which subsequent evolution is manifested primarily through upgrades in governance technology and improvements in control efficiency, rather than through any directional change [7][9][10][11].

2. The Mobilization Regime (1949–1989)

The first stage of CCP rule can be characterized in its entirety as a mobilization-oriented governing regime centered on mass mobilization as its primary instrument of governance. Under conditions of severe resource scarcity and weak institutional capacity, this regime demonstrated extraordinary short-term organizational and control capabilities. Yet its internal logic also predetermined a high degree of instability and unsustainability. The history from 1949 to 1989 was not a linear trajectory from radicalism toward rationality, but rather a process in which a mobilization regime was repeatedly activated, patched, and further depleted at successive crisis points, ultimately culminating in systemic failure [4][6][10][11].

2.1 Mass Mobilization as the Primary Instrument of Governance

The defining feature of mobilization-oriented rule lies in treating mass mobilization itself as a governing tool. Rather than relying on stable institutional rules, interest negotiation, or technical governance, the regime continuously manufactured political tasks, moral imperatives, and friend–enemy distinctions, directly drawing society into the governing process [6][10].

Under this system, governance did not operate as a normalized routine but unfolded through recurring “campaigns”. Political authority sustained its legitimacy by repeatedly reaffirming the correctness of the line and the necessity of struggle; obedience was moralized, while dissent was politicized. Social organizations, economic activities, and individual life were all embedded within political objectives [6][11].

The advantage of this mode of rule lay in its extreme flexibility and immediate mobilization capacity. The cost, however, was that governance became highly dependent on political fervor and organizational intensity. Once mobilization capacity declined, the entire system rapidly exposed a profound institutional vacuum [2][4].

2.2 The Continuous Drain of Political Campaigns on Society and the Economy

Mobilization-oriented rule was not a one-off expenditure, but a mechanism of continuous depletion. Frequent political campaigns repeatedly disrupted processes of economic accumulation, eroded structures of social trust, and compressed the space for institutionalized governance [5][6].

At the economic level, production order was constantly interrupted by political objectives, making stable incentive structures difficult to form. At the social level, campaign-style governance intensified uncertainty, pushing individuals toward short-term rationality and risk avoidance. At the political level, successive campaigns continuously raised the threshold of loyalty, causing the costs of rule to increase over time [4][7].

When political mobilization was repeatedly used to compensate for governance failures, mobilization itself gradually lost its effectiveness and instead became a new source of systemic risk [1][2].

2.3 On the Eve of Reform: Fiscal Exhaustion and a Crisis of Legitimacy

It must be emphasized that the crisis often described as the “eve of reform” did not first emerge in the late 1970s. In fact, the systemic crisis of the mobilization regime had already become fully apparent in the early 1960s and reappeared repeatedly thereafter in different forms [4][6][10].

• The 1961–1965 “readjustment”: Following the catastrophe of the Great Leap Forward, the regime was forced to reduce mobilization intensity and restore basic economic order. The objective was not institutional transformation, but the rescue of the mobilization system itself [5][6].

• The 1975 “rectification”: Amid the coexistence of intense political pressure and economic disorder, another attempt was made to restore system functioning through technical rationality and administrative repair [5].

• The 1978–1989 reform experiments: At the instrumental level, market incentives and economic loosening were introduced; at the political level, however, the Four Cardinal Principles were firmly upheld, and any challenge to the structure of rule was explicitly rejected [5][7].

These three episodes of adjustment were highly similar in nature. All occurred when the mobilization regime encountered a crisis; all invoked slogans such as “restoring order” or “liberating productive forces”; and none touched the core logic of mobilization-oriented rule. Consequently, 1978 did not constitute an entirely new beginning, but rather a larger-scale and longer-lasting repair attempt within the same system [1][4].

2.4 The Structural Significance of 1989

2.4.1 Not an Accidental Event

From this perspective, the political crisis of 1989 was not an accidental eruption, nor can it be understood simply as an “interruption” or “deviation” within the reform process. Instead, it occurred at a moment when the space for repairing the mobilization regime had been repeatedly exhausted, representing the concentrated manifestation of long-standing structural contradictions [4][6][10].

In the late 1980s, fiscal strain, runaway inflation, weakened authority, the failure of ideological mobilization, and disordered social expectations converged simultaneously. For the first time, the regime confronted a comprehensive crisis that could not be resolved through traditional mobilization or limited repair [5][7].

2.4.2 The Concentrated Eruption of Unsustainability

The decisive significance of 1989 lies in the fact that it forced the regime to make a fundamental judgment: mobilization-oriented rule, together with its reformist repair path, no longer possessed sustainability [1][4].

Repression itself did not solve the underlying problems, but it marked the formation of a critical conclusion—that the expansion of political participation, attempts at institutional reform, and the reactivation of social mobilization were all formally reclassified as “high-risk options” and no longer regarded as viable instruments of governance [2][7].

From this point onward, the mobilization regime was no longer merely something “in need of repair,” but was rejected in its entirety. The question confronting the CCP thereafter was no longer how to improve mobilization, but how to reconstruct a governing order on the premise of completely abandoning the mobilization logic [1][3].

This judgment constituted the precondition for the subsequent stage-based model of rule and laid the foundation for the institutional reconstruction launched by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1990s [1][5].

3. Deng Xiaoping’s Decisive Maneuvering (1989–1992)

After 1989, the CCP was not confronted with a localized crisis, but with a fundamental choice: the existing mobilization regime had been proven unsustainable, and the reformist repair paths repeatedly attempted before had also failed. In this context, what Deng Xiaoping undertook was not an adjustment that extended an existing line, but an institutional maneuver explicitly aimed at “sealing off political possibility space in both directions” [1][4].

This so-called “dual sealing” was neither simple political conservatism nor a rollback to an earlier line. Rather, it consisted of two decisions pointing in opposite directions yet mutually reinforcing in terms of governing logic. On the one hand, it decisively denied the legitimacy of popular political participation and institutional reform as tools of governance; on the other hand, it firmly rejected left-wing fundamentalist demands for a return to mobilization politics. Once both paths were simultaneously closed, the regime’s survival space was uniquely anchored to development-oriented rule [3][5][7].

3.1 Rejecting Mobilization: Repression as a Preemptive Clearing of Governing Logic

The repression of 1989 was not directed at a single, specific political event, but constituted a governing decision with preemptive clearing significance. Its objective was not the restoration of short-term order, but the fundamental revocation of mass politics and social mobilization as legitimate variables of governance [1][6].

This judgment is substantiated precisely because the repression did not occur at the moment of peak mobilization or maximum disorder. On the contrary, prior to the crackdown, the movement had already shown signs of ebbing: sustained mobilization capacity was declining, social responsiveness was cooling, and there existed a realistic possibility that the movement could have dissipated without the use of military force. Moreover, precedents for dismantling similar forms of social mobilization through non-military means already existed at the time [1][4].

It was precisely under these circumstances—where repression was not a case of “no alternative”—that the highest-intensity measures were deliberately chosen. Their significance lay in sending an unmistakable signal to both the political system and society at large: political participation, institutional reform, and mass mobilization were no longer to be treated as governable or repairable tools, but were instead collectively reclassified as high-risk domains requiring systematic prevention and suppression [2][7].

As a result, the mobilization regime not only failed in practice, but was also subjected to a decisive institutional liquidation at the level of elite decision-making. This liquidation constituted the necessary precondition for all subsequent reconstructions of rule [1][3][10].

3.2 Rejecting Left-Wing Fundamentalism: The 1992 Southern Tour and the Singularization of the Development Path

If 1989 completed the negation of moving “forward,” then Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992 completed the closure of moving “backward”. Confronted with the rapid resurgence of left-wing fundamentalist tendencies after the crackdown, Deng explicitly refused to respond to the governing crisis through ideological retrenchment or renewed mobilization [1][5].

The core significance of the 1992 Southern Tour did not lie in “restarting reform,” but in irreversibly binding regime survival to economic development. Through this decision, development ceased to be one policy option among many and became the only permissible governing path. Any attempt to restore order by re-emphasizing class struggle, political primacy, or the planned economy was excluded from the realm of feasibility [3][4][7].

Once this “dual negation” was completed, political possibility space contracted sharply.

• Forward, political reform and mass participation were categorically denied;
• Backward, leftist mobilization and ideological resurgence were equally sealed off.

The regime was thus locked onto a single trajectory—development as the sole fulcrum of the governing project [1][5].

3.3 Staged Task Allocation: An Institutional Arrangement Designating Two Successive Generations of Leaders

After completing the sealing of political paths, Deng Xiaoping did not place his hopes on prolonged personal rule. Instead, through personnel arrangements, he decomposed the staged governing project into executable historical tasks [1][7].

Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao—two figures with markedly different styles—were successively established as the next two generations of successors. This personnel configuration appears contradictory on the surface, but was in fact crucial. It was neither the outcome of factional struggle nor an attempt to institutionalize an abstract principle of “intergenerational succession”. Rather, it was a highly functional division of labor: a deliberate selection of executors with distinct functional characteristics suited to different stages of governance that were to follow [3][5].

Jiang Zemin’s role was to fully unfold development-oriented rule and stabilize the external environment. With a comparatively moderate, technocratic image—and crucially, without bearing direct historical responsibility for the June Fourth crackdown—he was positioned to advance marketization and globalization, completing the rapid accumulation of state fiscal capacity, industrial systems, and external embeddedness. Hu Jintao, by contrast—known earlier as the “Lhasa strongman”—was assigned a different task: after the crest of development had been reached, to initiate the transition toward a logic of control. Through prioritizing stability maintenance, strengthening social management, and further de-mobilizing politics, he laid the groundwork for the next stage of governance [1][2][4][7].

In this sense, Deng Xiaoping’s maneuvering was not a one-off policy intervention, but a cross-generational design of staged rule. Its core lay not in the extension of personal authority, but in locking in paths and orienting personnel so that subsequent leaders would carry out their respective historical tasks within a predetermined framework [1][10][11].

4. The Development Stage (1992–2008)

If “mobilizational rule” revealed intolerable systemic risks in 1989, then the “development stage” launched after 1992 was not a normative or value-oriented turn, but a highly rational governing project with a singular objective. The core purpose of this stage was not to construct a new political order, but to maximize the release of economic vitality in order to complete the primitive accumulation of state capacity—fiscal, technological, organizational, and coercive—thereby creating the conditions for an eventual upgrade of the governing form.

In this sense, the development stage was not the triumph of reform, but a strategic deployment aimed at delaying conflict and compressing political possibility space [1][5] [7].

4.1 Jiang Zemin: The Optimal Executor of the Development Stage

During this stage, Jiang Zemin’s historical role has long been misinterpreted. External observers often focus on personal style, portraying him as an indecisive, opportunistic “transitional figure,” or even treating his political flexibility as a sign of weakness. Yet under the structural requirements of the development stage, it was precisely this high degree of plasticity and the absence of a strong personal ideological line that made him the most suitable—indeed, an almost irreplaceable—executor [3][4].

What the development stage required was not a new route designer, but a central figure capable of minimizing conflict, extending the temporal window, and maintaining system operation along a predetermined direction. Jiang Zemin did not attempt to create a new source of legitimacy for the CCP, nor did he seek to reconstruct its political narrative. Instead, he transformed “development” itself into a depoliticized, technical objective—thereby suppressing intra-party line disputes, delaying political confrontation at the societal level, and reconstructing the external appearance of China as a “normal state” within the international environment [5][7].

This role positioning required him to perform two functions that appear contradictory but were in fact complementary: maintaining political ambiguity domestically while producing institutional certainty externally. Internally, he neither reopened the political assessment of 1989 nor challenged the existing power structure, instead repeatedly invoking formulas such as “development requires stability” and “reform must proceed gradually” to narrow the space for political discussion. Externally, by embedding China into globalization, joining international organizations, and projecting a technocratic image, he successfully repackaged post–June Fourth China as a cooperative and predictable economic partner [3][5].

In this sense, Jiang Zemin did not “change the line”; rather, he rendered the line itself politically non-contestable [1][7].

4.2 Post–June Fourth Developmental Division of Labor: A Successful Responsibility Segmentation

After 1989, the CCP did not merely confront a routine crisis of rule, but a dual breakdown of legitimacy and governance mode. How to continue governing without reopening political mobilization became an unavoidable question. In this context, the top leadership in effect carried out a highly precise division of roles [1][7].

Military repression fulfilled the historical function of terminating the mobilizational system, while its political and moral consequences were strictly confined to specific events and actors. The subsequent development stage, by contrast, was deliberately entrusted to a set of “non-repressive” leaders. Jiang Zemin’s critical role lay not in exceptional personal decisiveness, but in the fact that he was not strongly symbolically bound to the repression itself. This arrangement allowed the development stage to unfold before political memory had faded, without being derailed by persistent moral confrontation [1][3][5].

In outcome terms, this division of labor proved successful. The development stage did not resolve the problems exposed in 1989, but it effectively displaced them from the political arena into the domains of economic growth and social management, thereby depriving the governance crisis of the conditions for renewed concentrated eruption [2][7].

4.3 “Helping onto the Horse, Seeing Through the First Mile”: Power Continuity amid an Incomplete Development Stage

After Hu Jintao assumed the post of General Secretary in 2002, Jiang Zemin continued to serve as Chairman of the Central Military Commission for two additional years. This arrangement has long been interpreted externally as personal attachment to power or as an institutional flaw. Viewed through the logic of the development stage, however, such interpretations remain superficial [1][4].

If Jiang Zemin is understood as the executor of the development stage rather than its route designer, a more plausible explanation emerges: the development stage had not yet been completed, and key achievements still required consolidation. Development was not merely a matter of GDP growth, but a systemic accumulation of state capacities—fiscal extraction, local control, military modernization, and the depoliticization of the armed forces. At this late phase, any overly rapid or thorough transfer of power risked introducing unnecessary uncertainty into core institutions [3][5][7].

Accordingly, “helping onto the horse and seeing through the first mile” was not a refusal to relinquish power, but an institutional buffer applied while a phase-specific project remained unfinished. Jiang Zemin’s continued presence in the military ensured that developmental gains were not disrupted by shifts in political tempo, and it provided a stable precondition for Hu Jintao’s subsequent adjustment of governance priorities. From this perspective, the outcome reflects not the triumph of individual will, but the temporary requirements imposed by the logic of the development stage on the structure of power itself [1][4][7].

4.4 The Internal Contradictions of the Development Stage: Growth as the Accumulation of Risk

While the development stage succeeded in accumulating state capacity, it simultaneously amplified its own internal contradictions. Rapid economic growth did not dissolve social risks; instead, it reconfigured them at a higher level. Income inequality, regional imbalance, environmental degradation, mass incidents, and local government debt were not developmental mishaps, but structural by-products of the development logic itself [2][4][7].

In this process, privatization and marketization were assigned a highly instrumental role. They were not employed to establish civic rights or to constrain political power, but to release social vitality, shift governance costs, and defer political conflict. Power did not diffuse with the spread of capital; on the contrary, it was continuously reabsorbed through fiscal centralization, administrative integration, and the expansion of security apparatuses [3][5].

Accordingly, claims that “private ownership has completed its historical mission,” which surfaced at one point, were not ideological deviations but inadvertent disclosures of the stage’s interim objectives. The function of private ownership in this phase was not to found a durable institutional order, but to complete the primitive accumulation of state capital, technological capacity, and control instruments. Once this objective neared completion, the market itself was redefined as a source of risk rather than a force of liberation [1][5][7].

4.5 Summary: The Development Stage as the Midpoint Completion of a Governance Project

The development stage was not a golden age of CCP rule, but a highly rational and intensely instrumental transitional phase. Jiang Zemin was not a symbol of reform, but the most suitable executor for this stage. As resource accumulation approached completion and development itself began to generate new uncertainties, the development logic lost its legitimacy as the primary organizing principle of governance, thereby creating the conditions for a subsequent shift toward control-centered rule [1][2][7].

From this perspective, the development stage was not an opening window in history, but a necessary passage toward a control-based form of governance [1][10][11].

5. The Gradual Transition from Development to Control (2008–2018)

If the development stage from 1992 to 2008 completed the material accumulation of state capacity, the changes that emerged after 2008 did not constitute a dramatic “line shift” or abrupt reversal. Rather, they reflected a re-centering of governance objectives within an already established framework: economic growth ceased to function as the sole source of legitimacy, while risk management moved toward the core of governance. Development logic certainly continued to operate, but it increasingly resembled a form of “fiscal and technological provisioning for stability maintenance,” rather than a future-oriented narrative that required mass belief or participation [1][2][7].

The key to this gradual transition lay not in any single slogan, but in synchronized changes across the budgetary structure, organizational hierarchy, and information architecture of the state. Security and management agencies were elevated to more central positions; social uncertainty was redefined as the primary threat; and governance shifted from “handling outcomes” to “controlling processes”. Within this framework, many policies of the Hu Jintao era were not oscillations between moderation and conservatism, but elements of a systematic project aimed at laying down toolchains, training organizational capacity, and reducing political volatility in preparation for the next stage [2][4][7].

5.1 Hu Jintao’s Foundational Role: From Developmental Repair to Stability Priority

During this phase, Hu Jintao’s historical role has long been underestimated or mischaracterized as hesitant, weak, or lacking presence. Yet when viewed through the lens of stage transition, Hu assumed a crucial and highly risk-control-oriented task: gradually shifting the core objective of state governance from growth to control, without triggering major political shocks [1][7].

The year 2008 marked an important turning point. The global financial crisis not only exposed China’s deep dependence on external markets, but also clarified for the leadership that development did not equate to security, and that growth itself could amplify systemic risks. Particularly noteworthy was the convergence of “domestic security/public security” expenditures with national defense spending around 2010, followed by their continued prominence in 2011. This signaled a reorientation of threat perception from external competition toward internal uncertainty. Stability maintenance was no longer merely rhetorical, but was institutionalized as a core state function [2][7].

Accompanying this shift in governance focus was the formal consolidation of the discourse of a “harmonious society”. On the surface, this rhetoric emphasized fairness, inclusion, and social coordination. Its real function, however, lay not in political consultation or the expansion of rights, but in de-conflictualization and depoliticization. Social problems were reframed as “management issues” rather than “institutional issues,” and instability was treated as a technical malfunction rather than a political expression. Within this discursive framework, harsh measures against figures such as Liu Xiaobo did not represent a contradiction: “harmony” did not imply pluralistic coexistence, but the preemptive removal of uncontrollable voices [3][7].

During the same period, the information sphere underwent structural transformation. The internet was no longer regarded primarily as a tool for releasing vitality, but was redefined as a potential risk source. The Great Firewall was continuously strengthened, and a large number of prominent foreign websites were systematically blocked. For the first time, information flows were incorporated into the same security calculus as social governance. This shift was not a temporary reaction, but a sign that governance logic was moving from “outcome management” toward “process control” [8][9].

Even more critically, grid-based governance and grassroots information collection systems gradually took shape. By segmenting society into the smallest units that were monitorable, quantifiable, and accountable, the state acquired the capacity to identify, divert, and suppress risks at an early stage. This mechanism did not aim to eliminate problems altogether, but to prevent their linkage, diffusion, and politicization, thereby providing an operational technical foundation for more intensive control in the subsequent stage [8][9].

For these reasons, Hu Jintao should not be understood as a “weak leader,” but as the foundational architect of the third stage of governance. His role was not to complete control-based rule, but to render control a “reasonable, necessary, and sustainable” governance option, embedding this logic into the routine operations of the state apparatus [1][2][7].

5.2 Xi Jinping: Completing the Control Loop

If Hu Jintao’s historical task was to lay the foundations, then what Xi Jinping confronted after assuming power was no longer a question of directional choice, but how to convert existing control-oriented tendencies into an irreversible structure of rule. In this sense, Xi did not inaugurate a new governing logic; he completed an engineering project whose objectives had already been clearly defined in the preceding stage [1][7].

5.2.1 Anti-Corruption as a Clearing Mechanism

The large-scale anti-corruption campaign launched in the early years of Xi’s tenure is often interpreted as factional struggle, personal power consolidation, or moral rectification. Within the logic of control-based governance, however, its function is more precise: anti-corruption was not aimed at purifying politics, but at eliminating uncertainty. Through systematic strikes against both central and local power networks, preexisting informal bargaining spaces were rapidly compressed, horizontal alliances within the bureaucracy were dismantled, and the political system was reset into a highly verticalized, low-autonomy configuration [2][4][7].

This “clearing of the field” was not a temporary or transitional measure, but a necessary precondition for control-based rule. Only under conditions of highly unified authority and unambiguous obedience can technocratic governance and risk management be effectively deployed. Anti-corruption thus constituted the first critical gateway from foundational preparation to structural completion [3][7].

5.2.2 The Maturation and Normalization of the Stability Maintenance System

Once this clearing phase was completed, the stability maintenance system rapidly entered a stage of maturity. Society was no longer viewed as an object to be mobilized or persuaded, but was redefined as a collection of risks to be managed, monitored, and isolated. Measures such as the “709” mass arrests and the re-education camps in Xinjiang were not isolated incidents, but concrete manifestations of the same governing logic across different social sectors [8][9].

What these practices share is their refusal to persuade, integrate, or transform. Instead, they directly eliminate potential sources of instability through high-intensity, low-transparency interventions. At this stage, rule no longer requires justification of its legitimacy; it need only demonstrate effectiveness. As long as risks are controlled, the costs incurred are deemed acceptable [2][7].

By this point, the governance tools, information systems, and risk perceptions gradually assembled during the Hu Jintao era were fully integrated into a highly coordinated control apparatus. Society was thoroughly atomized, politics was comprehensively stripped of public character, and stability became the sole policy objective with substantive meaning [1][8][9].

5.3 Summary: The Completion of a Transition, Not a Turn in Direction

The period from 2008 to 2018 was not a dividing line between two distinct eras, but a transitional phase marked by a fixed direction and incremental acceleration. Hu Jintao completed the foundational shift from developmental logic to control logic; Xi Jinping, building upon this foundation, completed the governing loop. There was no fundamental divergence in direction between the two, only a division of labor across stages [1][2][7].

The completion of this transition marked the regime’s definitive departure from a model of “exchanging development for support,” and its entry into a control-based steady state in which order is maintained by control capacity itself [1][7].

6. The Phase of Comprehensive Control (2018– )

2018 was not a year of sudden rupture in Chinese politics, but it marked the public crystallization of a key fact: the control logic that had previously advanced incrementally no longer required concealment, buffering, or compromise in its expression. With the accumulation of resources, technological capacity, and organizational control mechanisms largely complete, the objective of rule shifted from “avoiding loss of control” to “maintaining a steady state,” thus entering a phase of completed control that no longer relies on development or reform as intermediary conditions [1][7][9].

The defining feature of this phase does not lie in the radicalism of any single policy, but in the comprehensive convergence of governing language, decision-making logic, and institutional structure [2][3][4].

6.1 Phase Characteristics: The Completed State of Depoliticized Rule

The foremost characteristic of the comprehensive control phase is the systemic withdrawal of politics itself. Politics no longer appears as public issues, value contestation, or objects of mobilization; instead, it is reconstructed as a highly technicalized set of governance procedures. In this process, society undergoes three forms of “de-”—three layers of subtraction [1][7][8].

First is depoliticization. Public issues are continuously reduced to governance problems; conflicts are redefined as risks; dissent is classified as anomalous signals. Political judgment no longer revolves around “whether something is legitimate,” but around “whether it is controllable”; direction is no longer debated—only parameters are adjusted [2][7].

Second is depersonalization. Individuals no longer enter the institutional field as bearers of rights or political subjects, but are identified and managed as data nodes, behavioral records, and risk indicators. The system no longer needs to understand human motives; it needs only assess whether behavioral trajectories deviate from preset ranges [8][9].

Third is the erosion of publicness. Public space is systematically compressed; collective expression is disaggregated into individual incidents; social linkages are treated as potential risk sources. Society is no longer conceived as an integrated whole requiring coordination, but as a set of objects to be isolated and classified [3][4][9].

Within this mode of rule, a highly unified, value-stripped decision language gradually takes shape inside the decision-making apparatus. All major decisions are ultimately compressed into a few core questions: Is it controllable? Is it bearable? Is it irreversible? Issues that lack controllability are automatically excluded; options whose short-term costs are bearable are deemed rational even if they erode social capital in the long run; paths that may generate irreversible consequences once initiated are treated with extreme caution [2][4][7].

Within this linguistic system, the people are systematically excluded from decision-making as political subjects. They are no longer regarded as actors to be addressed, but as variables to be managed. So-called “public opinion” exists only as a risk parameter within stability assessment models [1][7][8].

6.2 Matching Major Events: The Real-World Unfolding of the Logic of Control

The defining characteristics of the comprehensive control phase are not merely abstract theoretical inferences; they are consistently corroborated by a series of key real-world events [1][2][7].

6.2.1 Constitutional Amendment and Indefinite Tenure: Removing “Leadership Turnover” from the Institutional Variable Set

The structural significance of constitutional revision enabling indefinite tenure does not lie in explaining personal motivations, but in identifying a shift in decision-making grammar. Once the objective of rule shifts from “promoting growth” to “maintaining a steady state,” regular leadership turnover is redefined as a source of institutional uncertainty. The core variable in decision calculus is no longer “whether power should be constrained by term limits,” but whether leadership change introduces uncontrollable risks or disrupts consistent system-wide execution. Under the priority of “reducing volatility,” the simplest and most grammatically consistent output is to remove turnover itself from the variable set, thereby ensuring long-term consistency and a singular chain of responsibility [1][3][4][7].

6.2.2 Hong Kong’s Anti–Extradition Protests: Downgrading “External Costs” to Bearable Prices

The critical aspect of the Hong Kong events lies not in the scale of the movement itself, but in its potential for cross-domain diffusion and demonstrative linkage. The grammar of control first defines the issue as a “connective risk” rather than a “political demand”; second, it rapidly narrows the option set—compromise, delay, and dialogue are all seen as providing time windows for linkage; finally, at the output stage, “international perception and external reactions” are downgraded to bearable costs, while the imperatives of “closure” and “irreversibility” are elevated to veto-level variables. Consequently, the response converges on swiftly severing organizational space, compressing public visibility, and transforming the flexibility of “One Country, Two Systems” into a component of overall risk governance [1][3][4][7].

6.2.3 Pandemic Lockdowns and Abrupt Reopening: Two Convergences under the Same Grammar

The pandemic period most clearly illustrates the unified grammar of “controllable / bearable / irreversible”. At the onset of lockdowns, health risks were defined as systemic threats, and policy outputs naturally converged on extreme management with controllability as the highest priority. When the economic and trade costs of lockdowns approached the bearable threshold, the core variable shifted to whether the system could continue to function; the option set narrowed again—gradual optimization implied prolonged uncertainty and diffused responsibility—leading to a rapid reversal. These two seemingly opposite policies are, in fact, governed by the same grammar: not an open balancing of rights and costs, but parameter adjustments around system security thresholds [1][7][8][9].

6.3 Historical Echoes of the Logic of Control: A Structural Comparison with Shang Yang’s Rationale of Rule

Interpreting the comprehensive control phase merely as an expansion of power under contemporary technological conditions is insufficient to explain its high degree of stability and internal coherence. In fact, this form of rule is not a historical accident, but deeply embedded in a long-standing thread of Chinese political tradition. The most illuminating historical reference for this logic is the model of rule established by Shang Yang during the Warring States period [1][10][11].

Viewed from the perspective of techniques of governing the populace rather than ideology, there is no fundamental rupture between modern comprehensive control and the Qin system shaped by Shang Yang. Technological progress has not altered the objectives of rule; it has merely enabled the systematic implementation of exhausting, weakening, impoverishing, dulling, and fragmenting the populace with lower friction. The difference lies only in means: Shang Yang relied on overt violence and legal coercion, whereas contemporary rule achieves more concealed and sustainable control through market mechanisms, technological governance, and social pressure [1][7][10][11].

Technique	Original Meaning (in the context of The Book of Lord Shang)	Corresponding Mechanisms in Modern Control-Oriented Rule	Structural Objective
Exhausting the People	Consuming social energy through continuous labor and compulsory service, leaving no capacity for association or political deliberation	High-intensity work rhythms, competitive “involution,” normalized performance pressure and survival anxiety	Weaken social mobilization capacity and compress time available for public participation
Weakening the People	Undermining popular self-organization and autonomy so individuals cannot confront the state	Atomized social structures, dismantling intermediary organizations, restrictions on NGOs and civic associations	Prevent horizontal linkages and ensure direct state-to-individual control
Impoverishing the People	Controlling channels of wealth accumulation to prevent the formation of independent economic bases	Selective pressure on capital, wealth uncertainty, elastic and conditional property security	Prevent economic independence from translating into political independence
Dulling the People	Restricting access to knowledge and independent value judgment to preclude challenges to the logic of rule	Information filtering, algorithmic content delivery, dominance of entertainment-oriented media, systematic erosion of public reason	Lower systemic cognitive capacity and prevent the emergence of alternative narratives
Humiliating the People	Dissolving dignity and expectations of resistance through exemplary punishment and visible consequences	High-pressure treatment of “boundary crossers,” selective enforcement, public shaming, and cascading social penalties (employment, education, credit, etc.)	Induce pervasive self-censorship, crushing resistance psychologically before it can become organized

These five principles of governance are not directed at specific policies, but rather point toward a shared structural objective: the maximal reduction of social uncertainty and self-organizing capacity. Whether in the Qin state of the Warring States period or in contemporary control-oriented regimes under modern technological conditions, the core of rule lies not in cultivating identification or securing consent, but in ensuring behavioral predictability and the controllability of risk. [2][4][7][10][11]

It is crucial to emphasize that modern control-oriented rule is not a simple replication of Shang Yang’s overtly violent logic. The fundamental difference lies in technological conditions. Shang Yang relied on explicit laws, punishment, and organizational discipline, whereas contemporary governance embeds the same logic into everyday life through data, algorithms, and institutional design, thereby achieving higher-intensity control with lower visibility and lower friction. [8][9][10][11]

In this sense, the comprehensive control phase can be understood as a form of “technologized Shang Yang rationality”: order is no longer maintained through frequent repression, but through structural design that dissolves resistance before it can take shape. [1][7][8][9][11]

6.4 Summary: The Formation of a Steady-State Politics

The comprehensive control phase is not an endlessly escalating extreme, but a highly self-consistent form of steady-state politics characterized by low volatility and a severely constrained horizon of imagination. In this condition, rule no longer seeks identification, nor does it require justification; it needs only to maintain predictability. Risks are preemptively isolated, society is continuously atomized, and politics is fully technologized. [1][2][7][9][10]

At this point, the three-stage model of “mobilization–development–control” completes its closed loop. Politics no longer orients itself toward the future, but shifts into inertial operation; history no longer points toward transformation, but settles into a prolonged and extended present tense. [1][10][11]

7. Conclusion: The “Stability Trap” After the Completion of Deng Xiaoping’s Transformation

The three-stage model of rule—mobilization, development, and control—proposed in this article seeks to correct a long-standing misconception that has dominated narratives of Chinese politics: the idea that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has “experimented with different political models” across historical periods. Through a systematic analysis of critical historical junctures, governing instruments, and leadership arrangements, this article argues that such an interpretation is fundamentally flawed.

The CCP has not explored different political possibilities across stages. Rather, at different stages, it has employed different means to avoid the same outcome: the genuine transfer of political rights to the people.

This judgment is central to understanding the continuity of contemporary Chinese politics.

During the mobilization phase, political participation was highly activated through mass movements. Yet this participation was never conceived as a right; it was a political resource to be mobilized, commanded, and reclaimed. Society did not acquire political subjectivity, but was only temporarily absorbed into the operation of power. The failure of the mobilization system did not lie in its suppression of political rights, but in the excessive uncertainty it generated under conditions of high mobilization, driving governing costs beyond control.

During the development phase, political participation was collectively suspended. Economic growth and improvements in living standards functioned as a substitute arrangement—not as a path toward empowerment, but as a depoliticized exchange for social compliance. Marketization, privatization, and globalization were highly instrumentalized. Their core function was to release social vitality, complete the primitive accumulation of state capacity, and outsource political tensions into economic and administrative domains. Political rights were not temporarily postponed; they were systematically excluded from the agenda.

In the control phase, this exclusion was fully completed. Politics no longer required mobilization, nor did it rely on exchange; it was comprehensively replaced by technological governance and risk management. Society was atomized, public space compressed, and individuals reduced to calculable, predictable, and isolable units of behavior. Political rights were not explicitly negated; rather, they were rendered unnecessary, and thus exited the very design of governance.

It is through this continuous process of exclusion that the true historical significance of Deng Xiaoping’s transformation becomes visible. Contrary to conventional narratives that portray Deng as the “chief architect of reform and opening,” this article argues that his central contribution lay not in initiating reform, but in redesigning and locking in a sustainable evolutionary path for an authoritarian regime after the failure revealed in 1989. This path did not rest on political authorization, but on resource accumulation, technological upgrading, and the strengthening of control capacity, implemented through a staged division of labor.

Development was not the goal; reform was not the direction. Both functioned merely as intermediary instruments within this transformation. Through the staged functional assignment of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and the completion and consolidation of control logic under Xi Jinping, it becomes clear that the trajectory was not the product of leadership style differences, but of a highly self-conscious and incrementally executed project of rule.

Once the three-stage logic closed its loop, the political system entered a self-reinforcing steady state. In this condition, stability ceased to be a means toward a subsequent stage and became the justification for the system’s existence itself. Control capacity replaced legitimacy; risk management replaced political judgment; technological optimization replaced directional choice. Politics thus entered what may be described as a phase of paradigm fixation, in which change manifests primarily as tool upgrading and efficiency enhancement rather than reassessment of governing objectives.

This condition constitutes what this article terms the “stability trap”. It does not imply imminent crisis or collapse. On the contrary, it presents as a highly predictable, low-variance, low-elasticity mode of long-term operation. Stability is successfully achieved—but at the cost of the sustained erosion of social subjectivity and the permanent exclusion of political rights from the institutional imagination.

Accordingly, any historical evaluation of Deng Xiaoping’s transformation must remain suspended. From the standpoint of governing rationality, it was undeniably successful: a regime once heavily dependent on mobilization and repeatedly mired in crisis was reconstructed into a stable machine capable of maintaining order under modern technological conditions. Yet this success is not a neutral technical achievement. It is a form of stability premised on depoliticization, depersonalization, and the erosion of publicness.

This article does not seek to render a moral verdict. Its purpose is to reveal how this transformation was designed after failure, how it was executed through staged implementation, and how it generated a steady state that is difficult to escape once completed. Understanding this process is not about predicting collapse or celebrating stability, but about seeing clearly how a political system that elevates the avoidance of empowerment to an untouchable bottom line will progressively reshape its entire operational logic—and ultimately lock in its historical direction.

Appendix: Timeline of Key Events Across the Three Stages

Stage	Period	Event	Structural Significance
Mobilization Phase	1958–1961	Great Leap Forward and the Great Famine	Resource exhaustion and large-scale social destruction under a high-mobilization regime
	1961–1962	“Adjustment, Consolidation, Filling Out, Improvement”	Technical repair after mobilizational failure without altering the ruling structure
	1966–1976	Cultural Revolution	Radicalization and self-destruction of mobilizational rule
	1975	Deng Xiaoping’s “Rectification”	Efficiency-oriented repair under unchanged political red lines
	1978–1989	Reform and Opening	Release of social vitality without empowerment: a large-scale system repair
Turning Point	1989	Tiananmen crackdown	Preemptive liquidation of mass politics and institutional reform as governing variables
	1992	Southern Tour speeches	Leftist rollback blocked; “development” fixed as the sole legitimate intermediary
Development Phase	1993	Adoption of the “socialist market economy” goal	Marketization instrumentalized as a state resource-accumulation tool
	1994	Tax-sharing reform	Recentralization of fiscal extraction: institutional foundation of state capacity leap
	1997	State-owned enterprise reform	Risk transfer to society and consolidation of state extraction capacity (state capital formation)
	1998	Housing reform (accelerated marketization)	Assetization and debtization: converting social pressure into individual responsibility
	2001	Accession to the WTO	Embedding capital, technology, and supply chains through globalization; rising external intervention costs
	2002–2004	Jiang Zemin retains leadership of the military	Institutional closure of development-stage achievements
Transition Period	2008	Detention of Liu Xiaobo	Explicit tightening of political boundaries under “harmony/stability” discourse
	2010	Effective withdrawal of Google Search from mainland China	Information sovereignty prioritized over external technology and capital
	2010–2011	Domestic security/public security budgets surpass and intersect with military spending	Institutional signal of “internal risk first” threat perception
	2013–2017	High-intensity anti-corruption campaign	Comprehensive clearing of the bureaucratic system
	2015	“709” mass arrests	Systematic elimination of potential institutional challengers
	2016–2017	Comprehensive expulsion of foreign NGOs	Institutional closure of public space and international social linkages
	2017–2020	Xinjiang re-education camps	Regional experimentation and maturation of high-intensity control toolchains
Full Control Phase	2018	Constitutional amendment enabling indefinite tenure	Institutional alignment of power structure with steady-state control objectives
	2019	Comprehensive suppression of Hong Kong protests	External cost no longer a binding constraint; closure prioritized
	2020–2022	Comprehensive pandemic lockdowns	Stress test and normalization of extreme control capacity

References

[1] Ping Political. From Mobilization to Management: The 1989 Tiananmen Crisis as a Structural Turning Point. Working Paper, 2025.

[2] Gerschewski, Johannes. The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes. Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013): 13–38.

[3] Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

[4] Slater, Dan. Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

[5] Shirk, Susan L. The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. University of California Press, 1993.

[6] Perry, Elizabeth J. Patrolling the Revolution: Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State. Cambridge University Press, 2006.

[7] Nathan, Andrew J. Authoritarian Resilience. Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003): 6–17.

[8] Creemers, Rogier. China’s Social Credit System: An Evolving Practice of Control. SSRN Working Paper, 2018.

[9] Dai, Jinghua, and Guobin Yang (eds.). China’s Surveillance State. Routledge, 2020.

[10] Pines, Yuri. The Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and Its Imperial Legacy. Princeton University Press, 2012.

[11] Shang, Yang. The Book of Lord Shang (Chinese: 商君书).

版本: 1.0
日期: 2026-01-09
作者: 平行政界
机构: 独立研究者
Email: [email protected]
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18205295

关键词: 邓小平变法、极权转型、“动员—发展—管制”统治模型、1989年后的政治重构、极权统治的可持续性、技术官僚式治理、风险管理型国家、去政治化、以管制为导向的稳定、法家理性（商鞅）

摘要

本文以“邓小平变法”为核心概念，提出一个“动员—发展—管制”的阶段统治模型，重新解释中华人民共和国成立以来统治逻辑的结构性演化。文章认为，中共并非在不同历史阶段尝试不同政治模式，而是在不同条件下，以不同方式持续避免同一件事：将政治权利真正交给人民。1949—1989年的动员型统治依赖群众政治与意识形态动员，虽具短期动员能力，却因高度不稳定而不可持续，并在1989年被整体判定为高风险路径。正是在这一失败基础上，邓小平启动了一次具有制度设计意义的变法：不再尝试通过政治改革或再动员解决合法性问题，而是以发展作为纯工具性手段，系统性积累国家财政、技术与组织控制能力，并同步构建抵御外部干涉的结构性条件，为最终转向全面管制创造前提。在这一变法框架下，江泽民、胡锦涛与习近平并非路线更替的代表，而是被阶段化配置的执行者，分别完成发展展开、管制奠基与管制闭环的历史任务。由此，邓小平变法并非通向开放的改革，而是一场在改革失败之后完成的统治重构，其结果是一个以风险控制和技术治理为核心、以稳定本身为目的的管制型稳态。

0. 引言：为什么需要一个新的解释框架

0.1 既有叙事的不足

关于中华人民共和国成立以来的统治演变，主流叙事长期依赖两套高度简化的解释框架：其一是将1978年后的历史理解为“改革开放”的线性进步过程，其二是以“路线斗争”“派系博弈”解释高层政治的阶段变化。这两种叙事虽然在描述层面各有侧重，却共同回避了一个根本问题：中共统治逻辑本身是否经历了结构性重构，而非政策层面的摇摆。

“改革开放”叙事往往被道德化、目的论化处理，被理解为对文革失败的自然反弹，是一次通向市场化、制度理性乃至政治开放的历史修正。然而，这种解释忽视了一个关键事实：1980年代的改革尝试本身并未成功，而是以1989年的政治崩溃与暴力镇压宣告破产。如果将1989年视为“改革受挫中的一次偏离”，便无法解释此后三十余年中，中共统治方式为何呈现出高度一致、不断收紧且高度技术化的演进方向。[1]

同样，“路线斗争”或“派系之争”的解释，也越来越难以说明现实。一方面，领导人更替并未带来统治逻辑的实质性改变；另一方面，看似风格、话语、形象迥异的领导集体，却在关键决策上表现出惊人的连续性。这表明，中共高层政治的核心，并非路线竞争，而更可能是在既定统治工程中的角色分工。[1]

0.2 研究问题

基于上述不足，本文提出以下核心研究问题：

1. 为何中共统治逻辑呈现出清晰的阶段性演化，而非随机摆动或路线更替？
2. 为何在领导人频繁更替的情况下，统治方向不仅未发生逆转，反而不断强化？
3. 1989年之后的历史，究竟是改革的中断，还是一次更深层次制度设计的起点？

这些问题无法通过“改革—反改革”“开放—收紧”这样的二元框架加以解释，而需要一个能够同时解释连续性、阶段性与结果锁定的新模型。[1]

0.3 核心观点

本文提出一个“动员—发展—管制”的中共阶段统治模型，认为中华人民共和国的统治逻辑并非在改革与保守之间反复摇摆，而是在不同历史条件下，执行一个阶段化、目标明确的统治工程。

在这一模型中：

• 动员阶段（1949—1989）是毛泽东时代遗留下来的统治形态，其核心特征是高度政治动员、意识形态整合与群众运动治国。该阶段在政治与经济层面均告失败，并最终以1989年的全面失控为标志性终点。

• 关键在于，1989年并非改革进程的暂时中断，而是改革本身被判定为高风险路径后的否定性结论。[1]

• 正是在这一失败基础上，邓小平启动了一次全新的制度设计：不再尝试通过政治改革解决合法性问题，而是通过工具性发展完成国家资本、技术能力与管控资源的原始积累，并为最终的全面管制创造条件。

因此，本文所称的“邓小平变法”，并非一次通向开放的改革，而是一场以改革失败为前提、以统治可持续性最大化为目标的结构性重构。在这一重构中，发展只是手段而非目的，自由化被视为风险而非方向。

进一步地，本文认为，邓小平并非仅在1989—1992年间作出战术性调整，而是通过极具前瞻性的人事布局，分别指定江泽民与胡锦涛作为“发展阶段”与“管制过渡阶段”的执行者，从而锁定了中共由动员体制失败，转入发展蓄能，再迈向全面管制的演化路径。

在这一意义上，后续历史并非偏离设计，而是对这一设计的持续落实。胡锦涛后期的“维稳优先”与习近平时代的全面管控，并非路线逆转，而是同一统治工程在不同阶段的接力执行。

1. 理论框架——“动员—发展—管制”的阶段统治模型

本文提出一个“动员—发展—管制”的阶段统治模型，用以解释中华人民共和国统治逻辑的历史演化。该模型认为，中共统治并非围绕抽象路线或意识形态展开，而是在不同历史条件下，围绕政权存续这一核心目标，依次采用三种功能各异的统治形态。[2][7]

所谓阶段，并非渐进演化意义上的连续过程，而是指在特定条件下被确立、完成并替换的统治方案。每一阶段均以解决前一阶段无法应对的核心问题为目标，一旦阶段目标完成，其统治逻辑便随之退出历史舞台，而不再作为可选方案反复出现。[4]

1.1 动员型统治：高动员、低稳定、高耗损

所谓“动员型统治”，是指一种以意识形态整合、群众动员和政治运动为核心机制的统治形态。其基本特征在于：政权通过不断制造政治目标与敌我划分，动员社会资源直接服务于统治需要，而非依赖制度化规则或可持续激励。[6][10]

在这一形态下，统治效率并不取决于经济表现或公共治理能力，而取决于动员强度本身。社会被持续置于一种“非常状态”，个人被嵌入集体与政治任务之中，服从被视为道德义务而非制度契约。[6]

动员型统治的优势在于其短期动员能力极强，能够在资源匮乏、制度薄弱的条件下迅速集中力量；但其结构性缺陷同样明显：高度不稳定、不可预测，且对社会与国家资源的消耗极为巨大。随着时间推移，该形态必然面临动员疲劳、治理失序与系统性崩溃的风险。[2][4]

本文将1949年至1989年整体视为动员型统治的历史区间。期间虽多次出现经济松动与政策调整，但这些调整并未改变动员逻辑本身，而只是动员体制在危机中的周期性修复尝试。[1][5]

1.2 发展型统治：释放活力、积累资源、构建抗干预能力

“发展型统治”并非价值意义上的发展阶段，而是一种明确服务于统治目标的过渡性方案。其核心任务不只是缓解内部矛盾、积累财政与治理资源，更在于系统性降低政权在国际环境中的脆弱性。[2][7]

在这一阶段，政权主动降低直接政治动员强度，有限释放经济与社会活力，通过参与全球化、吸纳外部资本与技术、扩大对外贸易与产业规模，完成此前动员体制下无法实现的多重积累。这些积累具有高度工具性，其目的并不在于塑造公民社会或制度约束，而在于构建一个在内外双重压力下均具备承压能力的国家机器。[3][5]

从内部看，发展型统治通过财政扩张、基础设施建设和行政能力提升，使国家获得前所未有的资源调配能力，从而为后续更精细化的治理和控制提供物质基础。[4] 从外部看，发展型统治同步完成了对外部干涉风险的缓释：经济体量扩大、产业链嵌入全球体系、外汇储备与技术引进，使政权在面对制裁、外交压力或价值观冲突时，具备更高的回旋空间与反制能力。[3]

在这一意义上，发展并非单向度的“开放”，而是一种通过嵌入全球体系来中和外部约束的策略。当国家规模、市场依赖度与全球经济关联达到一定阈值时，外部力量对其进行系统性干预的成本将急剧上升，干预意愿亦随之下降。[3][4]

因此，发展型统治的功能不仅是暂缓内部冲突，更是为政权赢得一个相对安全的国际环境，使其能够在积累完成后，推进更高强度、更低妥协的统治形态。[1]

1.3 管制型统治：技术治理、风险隔离与外部约束失效下的长期稳态

“管制型统治”是指在财政能力、技术条件、行政控制力以及外部承压能力均积累到一定阈值之后，政权将统治目标从资源动员与冲突缓冲，转向对风险本身的系统性管理。在这一阶段，风险控制取代发展绩效，成为统治的核心逻辑。[2][4]

与此前阶段不同，管制型统治既不依赖群众动员，也不再需要持续高速的经济增长作为合法性来源。政权的稳定性不再建立在“发展承诺”或“改革前景”之上，而是建立在对社会与政治行为的可预测性与可干预性之上。统治不再以争取认同为目标，而以确保服从与可控为前提。[7]

在这一形态下，社会被高度原子化并拆解为可管理单元。潜在风险被提前识别、分类、标记并隔离，治理的重点不在于消除矛盾，而在于防止矛盾发生联结、扩散与政治化。政治问题被系统性地转化为治安问题、技术问题或个案问题，从而被去政治化处理。[9]

技术工具在此成为统治的核心资源。数据收集、持续监控、算法评估与网格化管理，使政权能够在不依赖大规模政治动员的情况下，对社会实施高频、低烈度但全覆盖的干预。治理不再追求共识，而强调效率；不再要求政治忠诚，而只要求行为可控。[8]

更为关键的是，在管制型统治阶段，政权对外部干涉的结构性恐惧显著下降，甚至发生根本性逆转。经过发展阶段的长期积累，国家在经济体量、产业链嵌入、金融资源、技术能力与国际依赖关系方面，已具备足以抵消乃至反制外部压力的能力。外部制裁、外交施压或价值观冲突，不再构成生存性威胁，而被纳入可管理风险之中。[3]

正是在这一条件下，政权得以摆脱此前对“国际形象”“外部认可”与“干预成本”的高度敏感，转而在必要时主动运用经济、外交、制度与信息工具，对外施加影响。对外行为不再以避免冲突为优先，而以维护统治安全与制度完整性为核心考量。外部世界从潜在威胁，转化为可以被利用、分化或施压的对象。[3][4]

管制型统治并不以“零问题”为目标。相反，只要社会整体维持在可预测区间之内，局部压制、定点清除乃至高强度打击，无论发生在国内还是外部，都被视为可接受甚至必要的统治成本。稳定不再意味着普遍满意，而意味着系统不失控。[2]

在这一意义上，管制型统治标志着统治逻辑的完成态：政权不再需要通过动员证明自身正确性，也不必通过发展交换社会支持，更无需依赖外部宽容或制度接纳，而是直接以控制能力与承压能力本身维持秩序。[1][10][11]

1.4 阶段之间的不可逆性与路径锁定

“动员—发展—管制”并非可以自由往返的政策循环，而是一条具有明显结构约束的阶段统治路径。每一阶段的确立，都会在制度、技术与组织层面排除前一阶段作为可选方案再次出现的可能性。[4][10]

动员型统治一旦被判定为高风险、不可持续，其所依赖的群众政治与非常状态治理，便无法在现代社会条件下重新启用；发展型统治一旦完成统治资源与抗干预能力的积累，其继续扩张反而会放大社会流动性与不确定性，成为新的风险源；而管制型统治一旦建立，其技术基础、组织惯性与治理成本结构，都会持续强化控制偏好，并自动排斥高风险选项。[2][3][8]

因此，阶段转型并非源于理念更新或领导人偏好，而是发生在既定统治目标与现实约束下的路径锁定过程。一旦某一阶段被确认“完成”，其统治逻辑便退出历史舞台，而不再作为备选方案存在。[1][4]

在这一框架中，领导人更替、话语变化或风格差异，并不足以改变统治轨道。它们至多影响执行节奏与呈现方式，而无法逆转阶段方向。当统治逻辑完成从动员到管制的闭环之后，政治系统便进入一种高度固化的稳态，其后续演进更多体现为治理技术的升级与控制效率的优化，而非方向性的调整。[7][9][10][11]

2. 动员体制（1949–1989）

第一阶段的中共统治，可以整体概括为一种以群众动员为核心治理手段的动员型统治体制。该体制在资源匮乏、制度薄弱的条件下，曾展现出极强的短期组织与控制能力，但其内在逻辑也决定了其高度不稳定性与不可持续性。1949年至1989年的历史，并非一条由激进走向理性的线性轨迹，而是一套动员体制在不同危机节点上反复启动、修复、再透支，最终整体失效的过程。[4][6] [10][11]

2.1 群众动员作为主要治理手段

动员型统治的基本特征，在于将群众动员本身作为治理工具。政权不依赖稳定的制度规则、利益协商或技术治理，而是通过持续制造政治任务、道德号召与敌我区分，将社会直接卷入统治过程之中。[6][10]

在这一体制下，治理不是常态化运作，而是以“运动”的方式展开。政治权威通过不断重申路线正确性与斗争必要性来维持合法性，服从被道德化，反对则被政治化。社会组织、经济活动与个人生活，均被嵌入政治目标之中。[6][11]

这种统治方式的优势在于其高度弹性与即时动员能力，但代价是治理高度依赖政治激情与组织强度，一旦动员能力下降，整个系统便迅速暴露出制度真空。[2][4]

2.2 政治运动对社会与经济的持续透支

动员型统治并非一次性消耗，而是一种持续性透支机制。频繁的政治运动不断打断经济积累过程，破坏社会信任结构，并压缩制度化治理的可能空间。[5][6]

在经济层面，生产秩序反复被政治目标打断，激励机制难以形成；在社会层面，运动式治理强化了不确定性，使个体趋向短期理性与风险规避；在政治层面，运动不断抬高忠诚标准，使统治成本随时间上升。[4][7]

当政治动员被反复用于弥补治理失败时，动员本身逐渐丧失动员效果，转而成为新的风险源。[1] [2]

2.3 改革前夜：财政枯竭与合法性危机

需要特别指出的是，所谓“改革前夜”的危机，并非1970年代末才首次出现。事实上，动员体制的系统性危机在1960年代初已全面显现，并在此后多次以不同形式反复出现。[4][6][10]

• 1961–1965年的“调整”：在“大跃进”灾难后，政权被迫降低动员强度、恢复基本经济秩序，其目标并非制度转型，而是挽救动员体制本身。[5][6]

• 1975年的“整顿”：在政治高压与经济失序并存的背景下，再次试图通过技术理性与行政修复恢复系统运转。[5]

• 1978–1989年的改革尝试：在工具层面引入市场激励与经济松动，但在政治层面始终坚持四项基本原则，明确拒绝触及统治结构。[5][7]

这三次调整在性质上高度相似：它们都发生在动员体制遭遇危机之时，都以“恢复秩序”“解放生产力”为口号，但从未触及动员型统治的核心逻辑。因此，1978年并非一次全新起点，而只是同一体制下规模更大、时间更长的一次修复尝试。[1][4]

2.4 1989的结构性意义

2.4.1 不是偶发事件

从这一视角看，1989年的政治危机并非偶然爆发的政治事件，也不能简单理解为改革进程中的“插曲”或“偏差”。相反，它发生在动员体制修复空间已被反复消耗殆尽之际，是长期结构性矛盾的集中显现。[4][6][10]

财政压力、通胀失控、权威弱化、意识形态动员失效与社会预期紊乱，在1980年代后期同时叠加，使政权首次面对一种无法通过传统动员或有限修复加以化解的全面危机。[5][7]

2.4.2 动员体制不可持续的集中爆发

1989年的决定性意义在于，它迫使政权作出一个根本判断：动员型统治及其改革式修复路径，已不再具备可持续性。[1][4]

镇压本身并未解决问题，但它标志着一个结论的形成——政治参与的释放、制度改革的尝试与社会动员的再启动，均被正式纳入“高风险选项”，不再被视为可行治理工具。[2][7]

从这一刻起，动员体制不再只是“需要修复”，而是被整体否定。此后中共所面对的问题，已不再是“如何改进动员”，而是如何在彻底放弃动员逻辑的前提下，重建统治秩序。[1][3]

这一判断，构成了后续阶段统治模型得以成立的前提，也为邓小平在1990年代初启动的制度性重构奠定了基础。[1][5]

3. 邓小平的决定性操盘（1989-1992）

1989年之后，中共所面对的并非一次局部危机，而是一项根本性抉择：既有的动员体制已被证明不可持续，而此前反复尝试的改革式修复路径亦已失败。在这一背景下，邓小平所进行的，不是延续既有路线的调整，而是一场明确以“双向封死政治可能性空间”为目标的制度性操盘。[1][4]

所谓“双向封死”，并非简单的政治保守或路线回摆，而是同时完成两项方向相反、却在统治逻辑上彼此支撑的决断：一方面，彻底否定人民的政治参与和制度改革作为治理工具的合法性；另一方面，坚决否定左翼原教旨主义对动员体制的回归诉求。在这两条路径被同时封闭之后，政权的生存空间被唯一地锚定在“发展型统治”之上。[3][5][7]

3.1 否定动员：镇压作为统治逻辑的前置清算

1989年的镇压，并非针对某一次具体政治事件，而是一项具有前置清算意义的统治决断。其目标不在于恢复短期秩序，而在于从根本上取消群众政治与社会动员作为治理变量的合法地位。[1][6]

这一判断之所以成立，正是因为镇压并非发生在运动最为高涨、局势最为失控的时刻。相反，在镇压发生之前，运动已呈现出退潮趋势，持续动员能力下降，社会响应逐渐冷却，甚至存在无需动用军事力量即可使其自行消散的现实可能性。同时，以非军事方式瓦解类似性质的社会动员，在当时亦已有先例。[1][4]

正是在这种并非“别无选择”的情境下，最高强度的手段被刻意选用，其意义在于向体制内部与社会整体发出一个不可误读的信号：政治参与、制度改革与群众动员，不再被视为可被管理或修复的治理工具，而被整体纳入需要系统性防范与压制的高风险范畴。[2][7]

由此，动员体制不仅在实践中失败，而且在决策层面被完成了制度性清算。这一清算，构成了后续一切统治重构的前提条件。[1][3][10]

3.2 否定左翼原教旨：1992年南巡与发展路径的唯一化

如果说1989年完成的是对“向前”的否定，那么1992年的南方谈话，则完成了对“向后”的封堵。面对镇压之后迅速抬头的左翼原教旨倾向，邓小平明确拒绝以意识形态回归或再动员来应对统治危机。[1][5]

1992年南巡的核心意义，并不在于“重新推动改革”，而在于将政权生存与经济发展进行不可逆的绑定。通过这一决断，发展不再只是众多政策选项之一，而成为唯一被允许的统治路径。任何试图通过重新强调阶级斗争、政治挂帅或计划体制来恢复秩序的方案，均被排除出可行空间。[3][4] [7]

在这一“双向否定”完成之后，政治可能性空间被急剧收窄：

• 向前，政治改革与群众参与被彻底否定；
• 向后，左翼动员与意识形态回潮同样被封死。

政权由此被锁定在一条单一路径之上——以发展作为统治工程的唯一支点。[1][5]

3.3 阶段化任务分配：同时指定两代继任者的制度安排

在完成路径封死之后，邓小平并未寄希望于个人长期执掌，而是通过人事布局，将这一阶段化统治工程分解为可执行的历史任务。[1][7]

江泽民与胡锦涛两个风格迥异的人先后被确立为接下来的两代接班人，这一人事布局看似矛盾，实则非常关键。它并非路线斗争的结果，也不在于建立某种抽象的“隔代接班制度”，而是一次高度功能化的分工安排，是为接下来的不同统治阶段选定具备相应功能特征的执行者。[3][5]

江泽民所承担的，是发展型统治的全面展开与外部环境的稳定化任务：以没有背负六四镇压历史责任的相对温和、技术官僚化的形象推进市场化、全球化进程，完成国家财政、产业体系与对外嵌入的快速积累。而胡锦涛作为当年的拉萨之虎，他的任务则在于跨越发展高峰之后，启动向管制逻辑的过渡：通过维稳优先、社会管理强化与政治去动员化，为下一阶段的统治形态奠定基础。[1][2][4][7]

在这一意义上，邓小平的操盘并非一次性的政策干预，而是一套跨代实施的阶段统治设计。其核心不在于个人权威的延续，而在于通过路径锁定与人事定向，使后续领导人在既定框架内完成各自的历史任务。[1][10][11]

4. 发展阶段（1992–2008）

如果说“动员型统治”在1989年暴露出不可承受的系统性风险，那么1992年之后启动的“发展阶段”，并不是一次价值意义上的转向，而是一项高度理性、目标单一的统治工程。这一阶段的核心目的并不在于建立某种新的政治秩序，而在于通过最大限度释放经济活力，完成国家在财政、技术、组织与暴力能力上的原始积累，为后续统治形态的升级创造条件。

从这个意义上看，发展阶段并非改革的胜利，而是一次延迟冲突、压缩政治可能性的战略部署。[1][5][7]

4.1 江泽民：发展阶段的最优执行人

在这一阶段中，江泽民的历史角色长期被误读。外界往往从个人风格出发，将其描述为缺乏定见、左右逢源的“过渡人物”，甚至将其政治弹性视为软弱的象征。然而，在发展阶段的结构性要求下，恰恰是这种高度可塑、缺乏强烈个人路线偏好的特质，使其成为最合适、甚至不可替代的执行者。[3][4]

发展阶段所需要的，并不是路线设计者，而是一个能够在既定方向上最大限度消解冲突、延长时间窗口、维持系统运转的中枢人物。江泽民并未试图为中共创造新的合法性来源，也未试图重构政治叙事，而是将“发展”本身转化为一种去政治化的技术目标，从而在党内压制路线分歧，在社会层面延迟政治对抗，在国际环境中重塑“正常国家”的外观。[5][7]

这一角色定位，决定了他必须同时承担两种看似矛盾、实则互补的功能：对内维持政治模糊，对外制造制度确定性。对内，他既不重新讨论1989年的政治定性，也不挑战既有的权力结构，而是不断以“发展需要稳定”“改革必须循序渐进”等语言，压缩政治讨论空间；对外，他则通过融入全球化体系、加入国际组织、塑造技术官僚形象，成功将六四后的中国重新包装为一个可合作、可预期的经济伙伴。[3][5]

正是在这一意义上，江泽民并未“改变路线”，而是让路线失去可被争论的政治形态。[1][7]

4.2 六四之后的发展分工：一次成功的责任切割

1989年之后，中共面临的并非简单的统治危机，而是一次合法性与治理模式的双重破产。如何在不重新开启政治动员的前提下继续统治，成为无法回避的问题。在这一背景下，高层实际上完成了一次高度精确的角色分工。[1][7]

军事镇压承担了终结动员体制的历史功能，其政治与道德后果被严格限定在特定事件与人物之中；而随后的发展阶段，则被刻意交由一套“非镇压型”的领导人组合来执行。江泽民在其中的关键作用，并不在于其个人决断力，而在于其恰好不与镇压本身形成强烈的象征性绑定。这一切，使得发展阶段得以在政治记忆尚未消散的情况下展开，而不至于因持续的道德冲突而中断。[1][3][5]

从结果看，这种分工是成功的。发展阶段并未消解1989所暴露的问题，但它成功地将这些问题从政治层面转移到经济与社会管理层面，使统治危机暂时失去集中爆发的条件。[2][7]

4.3 “扶上马，送一程”：发展阶段未完成下的权力延续

胡锦涛在2002年接任总书记之后，江泽民继续担任中央军委主席两年，这一安排长期被外界解释为个人恋权或制度缺陷。但在发展阶段的逻辑下，这种解释显得过于表层。[1][4]

如果将江泽民理解为发展阶段的执行人而非路线设计者，那么其延任军委主席，更合理的解释是：发展阶段尚未完成，关键成果仍需巩固。发展并不只是GDP增长的过程，更是国家对财政汲取能力、地方控制能力、军队现代化与非政治化重塑的系统积累。在这一阶段末期，任何过快、过彻底的权力交接，都可能在核心部门引入不必要的不确定性。[3][5][7]

因此，“扶上马，送一程”并非权力不肯交出，而是一种阶段性工程尚未收尾时的制度缓冲。江泽民在军委的延续，确保了发展成果不会因政治节奏变化而被打断，也为胡锦涛随后调整治理重心提供了稳定前提。从这一视角看，这并不是个人意志的胜利，而是发展阶段逻辑对权力结构的暂时性要求。[1][4][7]

4.4 发展阶段的内在矛盾：增长即风险的累积

发展阶段在完成国家能力积累的同时，也在持续放大自身的内在矛盾。经济高速增长并未消解社会风险，反而在更高层级上重新塑造了风险形态。贫富差距、区域失衡、环境破坏、群体性事件与地方债务问题，并非发展失误，而是发展逻辑本身的副产品。[2][4][7]

在这一过程中，私有化与市场化被赋予了高度工具性的地位。它们并非被用来确立公民权利或限制政治权力，而是作为释放社会活力、转移统治成本、延迟政治冲突的手段。权力并未随资本扩散而分散，反而在财政集中、行政整合与安全体系建设中持续回收。[3][5]

因此，曾一度出现的“私有制已完成历史任务”之类论调，并非意识形态异动，而是对发展阶段阶段性目标的无意揭示。私有制在这一阶段的功能，并不在于确立长期制度基础，而在于完成国家资本、技术能力与控制工具的原始积累。一旦这一目标接近完成，市场本身就会被重新定义为风险源，而非解放力量。[1][5][7]

4.5 小结：发展阶段作为统治工程的中段完成

发展阶段并非中共统治的黄金时期，而是一段高度冷静、极度工具化的过渡阶段。江泽民并非改革象征，而是这一阶段最合适的执行节点。当资源积累接近完成、发展开始制造新的不确定性时，发展逻辑本身便失去了继续主导统治的正当性，也为随后治理重心向管制转移提供了条件。[1] [2][7]

从这一意义上看，发展阶段并不是历史的开放窗口，而是通往管制型统治的必经通道。[1][10][11]

5. 从发展向管制的渐进过渡（2008-2018）

如果说1992—2008年的发展阶段完成了国家能力的物质积累，那么2008年之后出现的变化，并非“路线转向”式的戏剧性翻盘，而是统治目标在既有框架内发生的重心位移：增长不再承担唯一合法性功能，风险管理开始进入治理核心。发展逻辑当然仍在运行，但它越来越像一项“维稳的财政与技术供给”，而不再是一个需要全民相信的未来叙事。[1][2][7]

这一渐进过渡的关键不在某一条口号，而在国家机器的预算结构、组织结构与信息结构开始发生同步变化：安全与管理部门被推到更靠前的位置，社会不确定性被重新定义为首要威胁，治理从“处理结果”转向“控制过程”。在这种框架下，胡锦涛时期的很多政策并非温和与保守之间的摇摆，而更像是为下一阶段铺设工具链、训练组织能力、并降低政治波动性的系统工程。[2][4][7]

5.1 胡锦涛的奠基作用：从发展修补到稳定优先

在这一阶段中，胡锦涛的历史角色长期被低估，甚至被误读为“犹豫”“软弱”或“缺乏存在感”。但若从统治阶段转换的角度观察，胡锦涛恰恰承担了一个极为关键、且高度风险控制导向的任务：在不引发剧烈政治震荡的前提下，将国家治理的核心目标由增长逐步转向控制。[1][7]

2008年是这一转向的重要节点。全球金融危机不仅暴露了中国对外部市场的高度依赖，也使高层更加清晰地意识到：发展并不等于安全，增长本身反而可能放大系统性风险。尤其值得注意的是，2010年前后，“国内安全/公共安全”相关预算与国防预算出现交叉并在2011年继续保持高位，这一信号意味着国家的主要威胁认知正在从外部竞争转向内部不确定性；维稳不再只是口号，而被制度化为核心国家职能。[2][7]

与这一治理重心转移相伴随的，是“和谐社会”话语的正式确立。表面上，这一表述强调公平、包容与社会协调，但其真实指向并不在于政治协商或权利扩展，而在于去冲突化与去政治化。社会问题被重新定义为“管理问题”而非“制度问题”，不稳定被视为技术性故障而非政治表达。正是在这一话语背景下，对刘晓波等人的严厉处置并不构成自我矛盾：所谓“和谐”，并不意味着多元共存，而意味着对不可控声音的提前清除。[3][7]

同一时期，信息空间开始发生结构性变化。互联网不再被视为释放活力的工具，而被重新界定为潜在风险源。网络防火墙持续强化，大量知名境外网站被系统性封锁，信息流动第一次被纳入与社会治理同等重要的安全议题之中。这一转向并非临时反应，而是标志着治理逻辑开始从“结果管理”走向“过程控制”。[8][9]

更为关键的是，在这一阶段，网格化治理与基层信息收集体系逐步成型。通过将社会切割为可监控、可量化、可追责的最小单元，国家开始具备在早期阶段识别、分流并压制风险的能力。这一机制并不追求彻底消除问题，而在于防止问题联结、扩散与政治化，为后续更高强度的管制提供可操作的技术基础。[8][9]

因此，胡锦涛并非“弱势领导人”，而是第三阶段统治形态的奠基者。他所做的，并不是完成管制型统治，而是使管制成为一个“合理、必要且可持续”的治理选项，并将这一逻辑嵌入国家机器的日常运转之中。[1][2][7]

5.2 习近平：管制闭环的完成者

如果说胡锦涛的历史任务在于奠基，那么习近平上台之后所面对的，已不再是方向选择问题，而是如何将既有的管制倾向转化为不可逆的统治结构。在这一意义上，习近平并未开启新的统治逻辑，而是完成了前一阶段已明确的工程目标。[1][7]

5.2.1 反腐作为清场机制

习近平上任初期的大规模反腐行动，常被解释为权力斗争、个人集权或道德整肃。但在管制型统治的逻辑下，其功能更为清晰：反腐并非为了净化政治，而是为了消除不确定性。通过对高层与地方权力网络的系统性打击，既有的非正式博弈空间被迅速压缩，官僚体系的横向联盟被拆解，整个政治系统重新回到高度垂直、低自主性的状态。[2][4][7]

这一“清场”并非阶段性措施，而是管制型统治的必要前提。只有在权力结构高度单一、服从逻辑明确的条件下，技术化治理与风险管理才能顺利展开。反腐因此成为从奠基走向完成的第一道关口。[3][7]

5.2.2 维稳体系的成熟与常态化

在清场完成之后，维稳体系迅速进入成熟阶段。社会不再被视为需要动员或争取的对象，而被重新定义为需要管理、监测与隔离的风险集合体。709大抓捕、新疆再教育营等措施，并非孤立事件，而是这一治理逻辑在不同社会板块中的具体展开。[8][9]

这些实践的共同特征在于：它们并不试图说服、整合或转化，而是通过高强度、低透明度的方式直接消除潜在不稳定因素。在这一阶段，统治不再需要解释其正当性，只需证明其有效性。只要风险被控制，代价即被视为可接受。[2][7]

至此，胡锦涛时期逐步铺设的治理工具、信息体系与风险认知，被完整整合进一个高度协同的管制系统之中。社会被彻底原子化，政治被彻底去公共化，而稳定则成为唯一具有实质意义的政策目标。[1][8][9]

5.3 小结：过渡的完成而非路线的转折

2008—2018年并非两个时代的分界线，而是一段方向已定、节奏递进的过渡期。胡锦涛完成了从发展逻辑向管制逻辑的奠基，习近平则在此基础上完成了统治闭环。二者之间不存在根本性的路线分歧，只有阶段任务的不同分工。[1][2][7]

这一过渡的完成，标志着中共统治正式脱离“以发展换支持”的模式，进入一个以控制能力本身维持秩序的管制型稳态。[1][7]

6. 全面管制阶段（2018– ）

2018年并非中国政治发生突变的一年，但它标志着一个关键事实的公开化：此前渐进推进的管制逻辑，已不再需要遮蔽、缓冲或折中表达。随着资源积累、技术能力与组织控制手段全面到位，统治目标开始从“避免失控”转向“维持稳态”，从而进入一个不再以发展或改革作为中介条件的管制完成阶段。[1][7][9]

这一阶段的核心特征，并不体现在单一政策的激进程度上，而在于统治语言、决策逻辑与制度结构的全面收敛。[2][3][4]

6.1 阶段特征：去政治化的统治完成态

全面管制阶段的首要特征，是政治本身的系统性退场。政治不再以公共议题、价值争论或动员对象的形式出现，而被重构为一套高度技术化的治理流程。在这一过程中，社会经历了三重“去化”。[1][7][8]

首先是去政治化。公共问题被持续降维为治理问题，冲突被重新定义为风险，异议被归类为异常信号。政治判断不再围绕“是否正当”，而围绕“是否可控”；不再讨论方向，而只讨论参数。[2][7]

其次是去人格化。个人不再以权利主体或政治主体的身份进入制度视野，而是以数据节点、行为记录与风险指标的形式被识别和管理。制度不再需要理解人的动机，只需评估其行为轨迹是否偏离预设区间。[8][9]

再次是去公共性。公共空间被系统性压缩，集体表达被拆解为个体事件，社会联结被视为潜在风险源。社会不再被看作一个需要整合的整体，而是一组需要隔离与分类的对象集合。[3][4][9]

在这一统治形态下，决策层内部逐渐形成一种高度统一、去价值化的判断语言。所有重大决策最终都被压缩为几个核心问题：是否可控、是否可承受、是否不可逆。凡不具备可控性的问题，自动被排除；凡短期代价可承受的方案，即使长期损耗社会资本，也被视为理性选择；凡一旦启动可能产生不可逆后果的路径，则被极度谨慎对待。[2][4][7]

在这一语言体系中，人民作为政治主体被系统性排除在决策层面之外。他们不再被视为需要回应的对象，而是需要管理的变量。所谓“民意”，只在稳定评估模型中以风险参数的形式存在。[1][7] [8]

6.2 重大事件匹配：管制逻辑的现实展开

全面管制阶段的统治特征，并非抽象理论推演，而在一系列关键事件中得到了高度一致的现实印证。[1][2][7]

6.2.1 修宪连任：把“领导人更替”从制度变量中移除

修宪连任的结构意义，不在于解释个人动机，而在于识别决策语法的变化：当统治目标从“推动增长”转向“维持稳态”，领导人定期更替会被重新定义为一种制度性不确定性源。此时决策计算的核心变量不再是“权力是否应受任期约束”，而是“权力更替是否引入不可控风险、是否影响系统一致执行”。在“降低波动”的优先级下，最省事也最符合语法的输出，就是把更替本身从变量中剔除，以确保长期一致性与责任链的单一化。[1][3][4][7]

6.2.2 香港反送中：把“外部成本”降格为可承受代价

香港事件的关键，不在于运动规模本身，而在于它具备跨域扩散与示范联动的潜力。管制型语法首先把问题定义为“可联结风险”而非“政治诉求”；其次把可选集迅速收窄——妥协、拖延与对话都意味着为联结提供时间窗口；最后在输出端将“国际观感与外部反应”降格为可承受代价，而将“必须收口、必须不可逆”抬升为一票否决变量。于是处理方式收敛为：快速切断组织化空间、压缩公共可见性，并把“一国两制的弹性”转化为“整体风险治理的一部分”。[1][3][4][7]

6.2.3 疫情封控与突然放开：同一语法下的两次收敛

疫情阶段最能呈现“可控/可承受/不可逆”的统一语法：封控开始时，健康风险被定义为系统性威胁，政策输出自然收敛到“以可控为最高优先级”的极限管理；而当封控的经济与外贸代价逼近不可承受阈值时，核心变量切换为“系统运行是否还能维持”，可选集再次被收窄——渐进优化意味着长期不确定与多头责任；于是输出又收敛为快速转向。两次看似相反的政策，背后其实是同一套语法：不是围绕权利与代价的公开权衡，而是围绕系统安全阈值的参数调整。[1][7][8][9]

6.3 管制逻辑的历史回声：与商鞅统治理性的结构对照

如果将全面管制阶段仅理解为当代技术条件下的权力扩张，仍然不足以解释其高度稳定性与自洽性。事实上，这一统治形态并非历史偶然，而是深深嵌入中国政治传统的一条长期逻辑线索之中。对这一逻辑最具启发性的历史参照，正是战国时期由商鞅所奠定的统治模型。[1][10][11]

若从御民之术而非意识形态出发观察，现代全面管制型统治与商鞅秦制之间并不存在本质断裂。所谓技术进步，并未改变统治目标，而只是以更低摩擦的方式，完成了疲民、弱民、贫民、愚民与分民的系统化实施。不同之处仅在于，商鞅依赖显性暴力与法令，而当代统治则通过市场机制、技术治理与社会压力，实现了更为隐蔽且可持续的控制。[1][7][10][11]

驭民五术	原始含义（商君书语境）	现代管制型统治中的对应机制	结构性目的
疲民	以持续劳作与役使消耗社会精力，使其无暇结社、议政	高强度工作节奏、竞争性内卷、绩效与生存压力常态化	削弱社会动员能力，压缩公共参与时间
弱民	削弱民间自组织与自治能力，使个人无法对抗国家	原子化社会结构、打散中间组织、限制NGO与社团	防止横向联结，确保国家对个体的直接面对
贫民	控制财富积累渠道，防止独立经济基础形成	对资本的选择性打压、财富不确定性、产权安全弹性化	防止经济独立性转化为政治独立性
愚民	限制知识获取与价值判断能力，防止质疑统治逻辑	信息过滤、算法投喂、娱乐化内容主导，公共理性被系统性稀释	降低系统性认知能力，防止形成替代叙事
辱民	通过示范性惩罚与可见后果消解主体尊严与反抗预期	对“越界者”的高压处置、选择性执法、公开通报与社会性后果（职业/教育/信用等）	形成普遍的自我审查，使反抗在组织化之前被心理成本压垮

这五种治理原则并非针对具体政策，而是指向一种共同的统治目标：最大限度降低社会的不确定性与自组织能力。无论是在战国时期的秦国，还是在现代技术条件下的管制型国家，统治的核心并不在于塑造认同或争取共识，而在于确保行为的可预测性与风险的可控性。[2][4][7][10][11]

需要强调的是，现代管制型统治并非简单复刻商鞅时代的暴力逻辑。二者的根本差异在于技术条件：商鞅依赖的是法令、惩罚与组织纪律，而现代统治则通过数据、算法与制度设计，将同一套逻辑嵌入日常生活之中，从而在更低可见度、更低摩擦的情况下实现更高强度的控制。[8][9][10] [11]

正是在这一意义上，全面管制阶段可以被理解为一种“技术化的商鞅理性”：不是通过频繁镇压维持秩序，而是通过结构设计，使反抗在形成之前即被消解。[1][7][8][9][11]

6.4 小结：稳态政治的形成

全面管制阶段并非一个不断激化的极端状态，而是一种高度自洽、低波动、低想象空间的稳态政治。在这一状态下，统治不再追求认同，也不再需要解释，只需维持可预测性。风险被提前隔离，社会被持续原子化，政治被彻底技术化。[1][2][7][9][10]

至此，“动员—发展—管制”的三阶段统治模型完成闭环。政治不再面向未来，而转入惯性运行；历史不再指向转型，而进入一种长期延展的现在时。[1][10][11]

7. 结论：邓小平变法完成之后的“稳定陷阱”

本文提出的“动员—发展—管制”三阶段统治模型，旨在纠正一种长期主导中国政治叙事的误解：即将中共的历史演化理解为在不同阶段“尝试不同政治模式”。通过对关键历史节点、统治工具与人事布局的系统分析，本文认为，这一理解在根本上是错误的。

中共并非在不同阶段探索不同政治可能性，而是在不同阶段，用不同方式避免同一件事：把政治权利真正交给人民。

这一判断构成理解当代中国政治连续性的关键。

在动员阶段，政治参与以群众运动的形式被高度激活，但这种参与从来不是权利，而是被动员、被指挥、被回收的政治资源。社会并未获得政治主体性，而只是被暂时纳入权力运作。动员体制的失败，并非因为其压制了政治权利，而是因为它在高动员状态下制造了过高的不确定性，使统治成本失控。

在发展阶段，政治参与被整体搁置。经济增长与生活改善成为替代性安排，其功能并非通向赋权，而是以去政治化的方式换取社会顺从。市场化、私有化与全球化在这一阶段被高度工具化，其核心作用在于释放社会活力、完成国家能力的原始积累，同时将政治问题外包为经济与治理问题。政治权利并未被暂缓等待，而是被系统性排除在议程之外。

在管制阶段，这一排除过程被彻底完成。政治不再需要动员，也不再需要交换，而是被技术治理与风险管理全面取代。社会被原子化，公共空间被压缩，个人被还原为可计算、可预测、可隔离的行为单元。政治权利在这一阶段并非被否定，而是被证明为“不被需要”，从而退出统治设计本身。

正是在这一连续排除的过程中，“邓小平变法”显现出其真正的历史意义。与传统叙事将其定位为“改革开放总设计师”不同，本文认为，邓小平的核心贡献，并不在于开启改革，而在于在1989年这一失败节点之后，为一个极权政体重新设计并锁定了一条可持续的演化路径。这一路径不以政治授权为前提，而以资源积累、技术升级与控制能力强化为核心，通过阶段化分工逐步落实。

所谓发展，并非目标；所谓改革，亦非方向。它们只是这场变法中的中介工具。通过对江泽民与胡锦涛的阶段性职能配置，以及习近平时期管制逻辑的完成与固化，可以清晰看到，这并非领导人风格差异所致，而是一项高度自觉、逐步推进的统治工程。

当三阶段逻辑完成闭环，政治系统随之进入一种自我强化的稳态。在这一稳态中，稳定不再是通向下一阶段的手段，而成为制度存在的理由本身。控制能力取代合法性，风险管理取代政治判断，技术优化取代方向选择。政治由此进入一种可以称之为“范式固化期”的状态，其变化主要表现为工具升级与执行效率提升，而非统治目标的重新评估。

这一状态构成本文所称的“稳定陷阱”。它并不意味着即刻的危机或崩溃，恰恰相反，它表现为一种高度可预测、低变异、低调整弹性的长期运行模式。稳定在其中被成功实现，但其代价是社会主体性的持续削弱，是政治权利被永久性地排除在制度想象之外。

因此，对邓小平变法的历史评价不可避免地处于悬置之中。从统治理性的角度看，它无疑是成功的：一个曾高度依赖动员、频繁陷入危机的政体，被重构为能够在现代技术条件下长期维持秩序的稳定机器。但这一成功并非中性的技术成就，而是一种以去政治化、去人格化与去公共性为前提的稳定。

本文并不试图给出道德裁断。它所做的，是揭示这场变法如何在失败之后被设计，如何通过阶段化执行完成闭环，又如何在完成之后生成一种难以逃离的稳态。理解这一过程，并非为了预言崩溃或赞美稳定，而是为了看清：当一个政治系统将“避免赋权”确立为不可触碰的底线时，它将如何一步步重塑自身的全部运行逻辑，并最终锁定自己的历史方向。

附录：三阶段关键事件时间轴

阶段	时间	事件	意义
动员阶段	1949–1956	新民主主义建设	经济初步恢复
	1957–1961	反右、大跃进与大饥荒	高动员体制的资源透支与社会破坏
	1961–1962	调整、巩固、充实、提高	失败后的技术性修补，不触及统治结构
	1966-1976	文化大革命	动员型统治的极端化与自我毁灭
	1975	邓小平整顿	在政治底线不变前提下的效率修复尝试
	1976	批邓：反击右倾翻案风	再次诉诸动员型统治
	1978-1989	改革开放	释放活力但拒绝赋权：一次规模更大的“体制修补”
转折点	1989	六四镇压	对群众政治/制度改革作为治理变量的前置清算
	1992	南巡讲话	左翼回摆被封堵，“发展”被确立为唯一合法中介
发展阶段	1993	市场经济目标确立	市场化被工具化为国家积累资源的手段
	1994	分税制改革	财政汲取能力再集中：国家能力跃迁的制度底盘
	1997	国企改革	风险向社会转移、国家攫取能力强化（国家资本塑形）
	1998	住房制度改革（住房市场化加速）	资产化与债务化机制：把社会压力转化为个体责任
	2001	加入WTO	借全球化完成资本、技术、产业链嵌入与外部成本上升
	2002-2004	江泽民继续掌军	发展成果的制度性收尾
过渡期	2008	刘晓波被拘押	“和谐/稳定”话语下的政治边界明确收紧
	2010	Google搜索服务实质退出中国大陆	信息主权优先：外部技术/资本可让位于可控性
	2010-2011	国内安全/公共安全预算与军费交叉并持续高位	“内部风险优先”的制度信号
	2013-2017	高压反腐	官僚体系被彻底清场
	2015	709大抓捕	对潜在制度性挑战的系统性清除
	2016-2017	全面清退境外NGO	切断社会公共性与国际连接通道的制度化收口
	2017-2020	新疆再教育营	高强度管制逻辑的区域性实验与工具链成熟
全面管控阶段	2018	修宪连任	权力结构与稳态管制目标的制度匹配
	2019	香港反送中被全面镇压	“外部干涉成本”不再构成关键约束：收口优先
	2020-2022	疫情全面封控	管制能力的极限压力测试与常态化运用

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